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Category-Specific Disorders are frequently explained by suggesting that living and 
non-living things are processed in separate subsystems (e.g. Caramazza & Shelton, 
1998). If subsystems exist, there should be benefits for normal processing, beyond the 
influence of perceptual similarity. However, no previous study has separated the 
relative influences of similarity and semantic category. We created novel examples of 
living and non-living things so category and similarity could be manipulated 
independently. Pre-tests ensured that our images evoked appropriate semantic 
information and were matched for familiarity. Participants were trained to associate 
names with the images and then performed a name-verification task under two levels 
of time pressure. We found no significant advantage for living things alongside strong 
effects of similarity. Our results suggest that similarity rather than category is the key 
determinant of speed and accuracy in normal semantic processing. We discuss the 





Is there Evidence of Specialised Semantic Subsystems from Normal Processing? 
 
The existence of selective semantic deficits for living or non-living objects has 
been used to argue that semantic knowledge about objects is processed by distinct 
neural subsystems, specialised for living and nonliving concepts (e.g. Caramazza & 
Shelton, 1998). Two of the original cases reported by Warrington and Shallice (1984) 
remain among the best examples. Their patient J.B.R. recognised only 3 out of 48 
pictures of animals and plants, but he recognised 43 out of 48 pictures of inanimate 
objects. Patient S.B.Y. did not recognise any of 48 pictures of animals and plants, but 
he recognised 36 of 48 pictures of inanimate objects. The strength of the dissociation, 
the fact that similar dissociations have been reported in a series of patients (e.g. 
Caramazza & Shelton, De Renzi & Luccelli, 1994; Farah & Wallace, 1992; Kurbat & 
Farah, 1998; Warrington & Shallice), and the existence of a dissociation in the 
opposite direction (an advantage for nonliving over living, e.g. Hillis & Caramazza, 
1991; Turnbull & Laws, 2000) are the phenomena which underpin the hypothesis that 
the semantic system is divided into specialised subsystems.  
We argue that these data alone do not force one to assume that semantic 
information is processed in separate subsystems because it is possible for category 
specific deficits to occur within a range of semantic organisations, including those 
that are unitary and unspecialised. Different organisations are not distinguished by 
whether or not selective deficits are possible at all, but by how often they should 
occur, and this can be difficult to assess. However, the structure of semantic 
organisation should also have an effect on processing in the undamaged brain. 
Converging evidence from intact participants should, therefore, form part of the case 





investigate whether participants without brain damage show evidence of semantic 
subsystems specialised for living things. 
Alternative Semantic Organisations 
To motivate the necessity of converging evidence from intact participants, we 
will describe several possible semantic organisations, and the kinds of 
neuropsychological deficits they allow. We will describe these organisations in 
explicitly topological terms. However, it is important to emphasise that this is a 
functional, and not a neural topology. Cats and dogs are likely to be closer to each 
other than cats and airplanes in a functionally described semantic space. They may 
also be closer to each other in neural space, but this is an independent issue. 
Specialised neural mechanisms may be more likely to be localised (Caramazza & 
Shelton, 1998), but if they were not, this would not change the functional issues.  
When describing how brain damage may affect a system that has a functional 
topology we make a few general assumptions. We assume that representations that are 
substantially independent are more likely to be selectively impaired than 
representations that overlap. We assume that damage can affect regions of functional 
space, such that adjacent functional regions are likely to be affected together. Finally, 
we assume that damage that is not contiguous is also possible (i.e. damage that affects 
independent regions of functional space, or damage that affects the space in a 
scattershot fashion). While these assumptions allow all the organisations that we 
describe to produce selective deficits in single patients, they do limit how often 
different patterns should occur across patients. 
We describe alternative semantic organisations in terms of a continuum of 
increasing specialisation. The semantic organisation that is least structured is a 





homogeneous space, damage can be specific to categories of objects, but only by 
chance. There are infinitely many subsets of objects that could be damaged together, 
and most subsets would not adhere to category boundaries. Therefore, category-
specific deficits should occur very rarely, and only draw attention because they appear 
systematic. 
However, a homogeneous space is just a baseline and we do not consider it to 
be a likely organisation. A structured unitary system, where related things are “near” 
each other, is much more plausible. In the neuropsychological literature this is the 
“lumpy” semantic space of the Organised Unitary Content Hypothesis (OUCH, 
Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp & Romani, 1990; Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatfield & Levy, 
2000, also argue for a structured unitary system). A “lumpy” space allows deficits to 
affect just living things or artefacts, but also more specific categories if appropriate 
dimensions define the space. Damage to a category as specific as aquatic animals, for 
example, is possible in principle. The frequency of different kinds of deficits will be 
determined by the specific features and processes involved in semantic representation 
(and, as always, by anatomical considerations that are orthogonal to functional 
organisation, e.g. brain regions near vascular pathways that are more vulnerable to 
stroke). 
A specialised subsystems account is the final organisation of semantic space 
that we consider. Two alternative subsystems accounts have been proposed. The 
system could be organised into separate subsystems for processing different 
categories of object or separate subsystems dedicated to the processing of different 
types of information. Farah and McClelland (1991), Warrington and McCarthy 
(1987), Warrington and Shallice (1984) have all proposed that semantic memory is 





Category specific disorders arise because certain categories depend disproportionately 
on one kind of information. Sensory information is though to be particularly 
important for the recognition of living things and functional information for the 
recognition of non-living things. More recently, Martin, Ungerleider and Haxby 
(2000) have proposed a variant of the original sensory/ functional theory, called the 
sensory/ motor theory, emphasising that the identification of manipulable artefacts 
relies heavily on knowledge about how to use the object. Although the 
sensory/functional or sensory/motor division has been supported by evidence from 
imaging studies on intact participants (e.g. Chao & Martin, 2000; Damasio, 
Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa & Damasio, 1996; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider & Haxby 
1996; Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D'Esposito, & Farah, 1999), the evidence from 
patients is less clear (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Kolinsky et al., 2002; Lambon 
Ralph, Howard, Nightingale & Ellis, 1998; Pillon & Samson, 2003; Samson, Pillon & 
De Wilde, 1998; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993). Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, and 
Caramazza (2003) review the category-specific literature and find that the majority of 
patients do not present with a disproportionate deficit for types of knowledge. In fact, 
the pattern of deficits is more consistent with divisions along category lines, 
specifically: animals, fruit/ vegetables and artefacts. Since a division along category 
lines reflects the pattern of deficits more closely than a sensory/ functional division, 
the current study will focus on the evidence for separate subsystems for different 
categories of object. 
Caramazza and Shelton (1998, see also, Kolinsky, Fery, Messina, Peretz, 
Evinck, Ventura & Morais, 2002) propose that specialised mechanisms for the 
processing of living things exist and are prone to damage because they are highly 





dedicated neural circuits for responding to and recognising animal and plant life. 
Animals may be classified as predators or a potential source of food. Plants must also 
be recognised accurately in order to ascertain their use as food or medicine. 
Caramazza and Shelton argue that these specialised circuits can account for the fact 
that the categories of animals, plants (including fruits and vegetables) and non-living 
things can be damaged independently of one another. More recently, Mahon and 
Caramazza (2003), specify a range of categories for which rapid and efficient 
identification could have survival and reproductive advantages. In addition to animals, 
and plants, there may be specialised neural circuits dedicated to the processing of 
conspecifics and tools. However, the patient data reviewed in Capitani et al. (2003) 
provides strongest support for divisions between animals, plants (fruit/ vegetables) 
and artefacts. 
Two kinds of subsystems accounts are possible. One includes specialised 
subsystems for living and nonliving things, with a homogenous space within each 
subsystem. The other allows “lumpy” spaces within each subsystem. These accounts 
make different predictions, but both prioritise the living/nonliving distinction.  
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) are equivocal about subsystem structure. They 
suggest that the only truly categorical deficits are those specific to animals, plants, 
and artefacts, a position that could be taken to favour homogenous subspaces, but they 
also say that their account is silent about subspace organisation, so that within the 
three fundamental categories, “lumpy” organisation is possible. Specialised 
subsystems prioritise the categories animal, plant and artefact, so selective deficits for 
these categories should be among the most common deficits. If the subsystems are 
homogenous, more specific systematic deficits will only happen by chance, and 





possible. Both accounts allow deficits to affect both living and nonliving things when 
lesions affect subsystems independently. 
In sum, a homogeneous space will rarely produce deficits that conform to 
category boundaries. Deficits that affect both living and nonliving objects should be 
common. A structured unitary system allows selective deficits more frequently than a 
homogenous system, but only prioritises living/nonliving categories if this constitutes 
one of the basic divisions in semantic space. Selective deficits for the categories of 
animal, plant and artifact could occur, but deficits would not be restricted to these 
domains. Dissociations across a much wider range of category boundaries would be 
expected. 
A separate subsystems architecture will frequently produce selective deficits 
for the categories that define the subsystems: plants, animals and artefacts. Deficits 
that cross these category lines are possible, but should occur more rarely. In fact, most 
deficits should affect the subsystems unequally. 
 Clearly, a structured unitary system and separate subsystems will be very 
difficult to distinguish. A fundamental difference, but one that has received little 
attention, should be that a structured unitary system is governed by set of principles 
that apply to all semantic knowledge, while subsystems are governed by domain-
specific principles (which motivate the division).  
Investigations of Normal Processing 
We have noted that the simple presence of category-specific deficits cannot 
distinguish alternative semantic organisations, since category-specific deficits are 
possible in any architecture. However, the frequency with which living/non-living 
deficits occur, and the specificity of damage, would differ for each type of 





organisations by assessing the frequency with which different types of deficit occur. 
However, this assessment would be complicated by anatomical factors (e.g. not all 
functionally-equivalent processes will be equally susceptible to damage by stroke), by 
reporting bias, and by the effort necessary to assess sufficient numbers of patients in 
enough detail to exclude non-semantic influences on their error patterns. 
The difficulty in assessing frequency of occurrence provides a strong 
motivation for underpinning patient results with convergent results from normal 
processing. A separate subsystems architecture should influence normal processing in 
a way that is qualitatively different from the other two organisations. A specialised 
subsystems architecture should give a measurable advantage to the categories for 
which it is specialised (i.e. living things). A homogenous architecture or a structured 
unitary system do not require categorical effects in normal processing over and above 
the influence of factors that affect retrieval (e.g. familiarity, similarity, visual 
complexity). Our experiments are designed to look for evidence of specialised 
subsystems in intact adults. If independent subsystems for living things have 
developed because of evolutionary pressures, the subsystems should improve the 
speed and accuracy with which novel living images are learned, recognised and/or 
named. 
 Although Caramazza and Shelton (1998) and Mahon and Caramazza (2003) 
make no specific predictions for normal processing, they invoke an evolutionary 
explanation for the development of selective semantic subsystems. However, for 
evolutionary pressures to act, there must be benefits for normal processing. In fact, 
Mahon and Caramazza argue that evolutionary pressures have resulted in specialised 
subsystems, only for, “those categories for which rapid and efficient identification 





prediction is implicit: If evolutionary pressures caused separate subsystems for 
animals and fruit/vegetables to develop, objects from these categories (i.e. living 
things) should be processed faster and more accurately than objects from categories 
with no dedicated sub-system (i.e. non-living things).  
Previous experiments that have investigated category differences in naming or 
recognition in intact participants have produced conflicting results. For example, 
Laws (2000) and Laws and Neve (1999) found an advantage for living things over 
nonliving things, consistent with the existence of specialised subsystems for living 
things. In contrast, Humphreys, Riddoch and Quinlan (1988) and Lloyd-Jones and 
Humphreys (1997) found that living things were named more slowly than nonliving 
things. 
Several dimensions have been identified as possible sources for differences 
between categories other than the category difference itself. Firstly, intrinsic 
characteristics of real objects such as visual complexity, familiarity, frequency and 
name agreement have all been considered potential confounding variables (Funnell & 
Sheridan, 1992, Stewart, Parkin & Hunkin, 1992). Humphreys et al. (1988) controlled 
name agreement, but not familiarity or visual complexity. Laws (2000) and Laws and 
Neve (1999) controlled visual complexity and familiarity, but not name agreement 
(which had an influence when assessed by linear regression). 
Secondly, since groups of animals usually share a basic body plan, animals 
have been considered more structurally similar than artefacts, and this “visual 
crowding” may make animals more difficult to name and recognise. For example, 
Humphreys, et al. (1988) attributed slower naming of living things to the structural 
similarity of animals. Gaffan and Heywood (1993) drew the same conclusion from 





people. More errors were made to pictures of living things. Since monkeys showed 
the same pattern as people, Gaffan and Heywood argued that the pattern was due to 
the visual characteristics of the stimuli, and not the semantic characteristics. Object 
decision is also slower for living things (Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys, 1997; Vitkovitch 
& Tyrrell, 1995) but category decision is faster (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). 
Gerlach (2001) found that the disadvantage living things suffer in object-decision at 
unlimited exposure durations reversed when objects were presented in the periphery 
for 150 milliseconds. He argued that global shape gave more information about living 
things when brief exposure limited processing, but when internal detail is available at 
unlimited exposure duration, the similarity of living things caused slower response 
times. Lloyd-Jones and Luckhurst (2002) also found that performance for living 
things was impaired less than performance for nonliving things by the presentation of 
silhouettes rather than full objects. In addition, same/different judgements take longer 
for pairs of animals than pairs of artefacts, and similarity ratings are higher (Lamberts 
& Shapiro, 2000). All of these results are expected if the structural similarity of 
animals allows quicker classification into the category animal, but slower 
identification, and, therefore, slower naming. 
Finally, time demands can potentially change the outcomes of experiments 
with living and nonliving objects. Humphreys, Lloyd-Jones and Fias (1995) found 
that an advantage for nonliving (dissimilar) objects at unlimited exposure durations 
disappeared when living and nonliving objects were presented for only 500 
milliseconds in a cued-naming paradigm. Unlike other experiments mentioned above, 






In sum, these studies have produced mixed results. Some found an advantage 
for living things and some found a disadvantage. In most studies (apart from Laws, 
2000), these effects have been attributed to intrinsic characteristics of the stimuli, 
which affect processing differently according to task demands, and not to the category 
difference. A common problem for these investigations was that all stimulus 
characteristics could not be controlled simultaneously. In particular, these studies did 
not isolate the relative influence of perceptual similarity and semantic category. Since 
Humphreys et al. (1988) and Lamberts and Shapiro (2002) claim that living things are 
intrinsically more similar to each other, it may be impossible to find sets of real living 
and non-living that are matched for similarity, without resorting to highly unusual 
members of each category.  
The Current Study 
In our experiment we address the three sets of issues that we have highlighted 
from the current naming literature. Artificial sets of stimuli have been successfully 
used to test detailed mathematical models of categorisation processes (e.g. Lamberts, 
1995; Lamberts & Brockdorff, 1997; Lamberts & Freeman, 1999; Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky, 1992). Borrowing from these paradigms, we constructed an artificial 
set of animals and vehicles in order to avoid some of the confounds inherent in 
research with real objects. Artificial objects also allowed us to manipulate category 
and structural similarity independently. Finally, evolutionarily important advantages 
that are not apparent under unlimited time conditions may become apparent when 
there is pressure to respond quickly. We asked people to respond under long and short 
deadlines to ensure that we did not miss categorical differences that only become 





We will focus on whether a separate subsystem for animals exists, since the 
survival value in quickly recognising animals provides the most compelling 
evolutionary argument. Caramazza and Shelton (1998) claim that a specialised 
subsystem for animals has evolved because of the importance of making quick 
decisions (while non-living things are processed in the more generic and, presumably, 
less efficient system). We will compare normal processing of animals with vehicles, a 
category for which evolutionary pressures could not have resulted in a specialised 
system. We created novel examples of animals and vehicles in order to manipulate 
semantic category and structural similarity independently. One set of animals and 
vehicles were perceptually similar and one set of animals and vehicles were 
perceptually dissimilar. We used vehicles, because, like animals, vehicles involve a 
hierarchical domain with a substantial degree of internal structure (e.g. different 
classes of vehicles: boats, cars, trucks, trains; different kinds in each class: boats, 
sailboats, motor boats, dinghies etc.). We trained participants to associate our novel 
objects with nonsense names. It was not necessary to control name agreement or 
frequency because the names were novel and counterbalanced across all conditions. 
We also systematically controlled the familiarity of living and nonliving objects. It 
was not possible to control visual complexity at the same time, but we did measure it 
in order to assess its ability to influence our results.  
When using novel images, it is important to ensure that participants do not 
treat them as purely abstract designs without semantic content. With abstract designs, 
no difference would be expected between what we have chosen to call “animals” and 
“vehicles” because the category labels would be arbitrary. However, if our images 
come to be seen as animals and vehicles during the learning process our design should 





images appropriately, using questionnaires to assess whether participants made 
appropriate assumptions about the semantic content of the images both at first sight, 
and after training.  
Manipulating category and similarity independently allows the following 
outcomes. If only semantic category affects name-verification, this provides 
converging evidence for the subsystems account, and indicates that similarity is 
unlikely to confound results from patients. If only similarity affects name-verification, 
perceptual similarity is also likely to affect patient performance. This implies that 
some category-specific results from patients may be explained by structural similarity 
instead. If both category and similarity affect performance, this is consistent both with 
a specialised subsystems account, and with the potential for similarity to confound 
patient results. 
Stimulus Construction and Pre-tests 
We used a graphics package that allows three-dimensional rendering of shaded 
objects (POV-Ray™, Persistence of Vision Development Team, 1991) to create five 
dissimilar animals and five dissimilar vehicles that had some resemblance to real 
examples of each category (e.g. mammals, dinosaurs, reptiles, insects; trains, boats, 
airplanes, rockets), but the objects also sometimes involved novel combinations (e.g. 
a rocket with wheels, a dinosaur with wings). Four of the animals and four of the 
vehicles made up the two dissimilar sets (labelled AD and VD respectively). The 
remaining animal image and vehicle image were used as the basis for two sets of 
similar images. Three single features were changed on the animal to create three 
related images, resulting in a set of four similar animals (labelled AS). The same 
procedure was used to create four similar vehicles (labelled VS). All images were the 





plausible for both animals and vehicles but not predominantly associated with one 
category. Figure 1 shows greyscale versions of the full set of images. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Participants 
Undergraduate and postgraduate students from the University of Birmingham, 
aged between 18 and 32, participated in the pre-tests used to assess the properties of 
the stimuli. Psychology undergraduates received course credits for taking part in the 
experiment and other students received cash payments. New participants were 
recruited for each pre-test. 
Pre-test 1: Similarity, Visual Complexity, Familiarity and Category Membership 
15 participants rated similarity and visual complexity first and then familiarity 
and category membership second, in counterbalanced order. It was important to ask 
for similarity and visual complexity ratings first because these tests required 
participants to ignore what the images represented whereas semantic attributes were 
necessarily involved in the familiarity and category pre-tests. 
For the similarity pre-test, all within-condition pairs of images (48 pairs) were 
presented in random order. Participants were instructed to rate each pair on a scale 
from 1 for a pair of images that looked nothing like each other to 5 for a pair of 
images that were almost identical. The similarity pre-test was used to ensure that 
similar animals and vehicles were rated as significantly more similar than the 
dissimilar animals and vehicles, but also to check that similarity did not interact with 
category.  
For the familiarity, category membership and visual complexity pre-tests, all 
16 images were presented one at a time in a random order. When rating each image 





image to 5 for a very familiar image. The familiarity pre-test was used to check that 
animals and vehicles were equally familiar, that similar and dissimilar images were 
equally familiar, and that there were no interactions between category and similarity. 
For the category membership pre-test, participants were asked whether the 
image looked like a vehicle, an animal, or neither. This test was used to ensure that 
the images evoked the intended category.  
When rating the images for visual complexity, participants were instructed to use a 
scale from 1 for a very simple image to 5 for a very complex image. It was desirable 
to have images with a similar level of visual complexity in each condition, but this 
could not be systematically controlled along with the other factors. However, 
measuring complexity allowed us to assess its affects mathematically. 
Pre-test 1 Results 
The data were analysed by participants and by image (F1 denotes the analysis 
by participants and F2 denotes the analysis by image). There was no significant effect 
of category on similarity rating, F1(1,14) = 0.84, MSE = 0.12, F2(1,44) = 0.71, MSE 
= 0.12. As expected, there was a significant main effect of similarity on similarity 
rating, F1 (1,14) = 474.29, MSE = 0.16, p < 0.001, F2 (1,44) = 488.86, MSE = 0.12, p 
< 0.001. There was no interaction between category and similarity on similarity 
rating, F1(1,14) = 0.17, MSE = 0.10, F2(1,44) = 0.10, MSE = 0.12. Table 1 shows 
that, as expected, the similar conditions were rated as much more similar than the 
dissimilar conditions.  
Table 1 also shows were no significant effects of category or similarity on 
familiarity ratings, category: F1(1,14) = 0.01, MSE = 0.88, F2(1,12) = 0.004, MSE = 





was also no significant interaction between category and similarity on familiarity 
rating, F1(1,14) = 0.004, MSE = 0.004, F2(1,12) = 0.004, MSE = 0.28.  
As shown in Table 1, the category membership results were nearly always in 
the expected direction. 
There was a significant main effect of category on visual complexity rating 
and a significant interaction between category and similarity, category: F1(1,14) = 
9.33, MSE = 0.20, p < 0.01, F2(1,12) = 7.58, MSE = 0.06, p < 0.02, interaction: 
F1(1,14) = 10.14, MSE = 0.42, p < 0.01, F2(1,12) = 17.61, MSE = 0.06, p < 0.001. As 
shown in Table 1, animals were more complex overall, but the dissimilar animals 
were rated as less complex than the similar animals while the dissimilar vehicles were 
rated as more complex than the similar vehicles. There was no significant main effect 
of similarity on visual complexity rating, F1(1,14) = 0.20, MSE = 0.52, F2(1,12) = 
0.43, MSE = 0.06. If visual complexity affects naming, the unequal complexity 
should give an advantage to vehicles over animals. In addition, it could make 
dissimilar animals faster or more accurate than similar animals, but similar vehicles 
faster or more accurate than dissimilar vehicles.  
(Table 1 about here) 
Pre-test 2: Nearest-Neighbour Questionnaire 
Ten participants completed the nearest-neighbour questionnaire. The entire set 
of 16 images was displayed on a computer screen. The experimenter pointed to each 
image in turn and asked the participant, “What real-world thing does this look like?” 





Pre-test 2 Results 
Responses to each image are reported in Appendix A. On average, half of the 
participants associated each image with the same real object. Only one response for 
each category was inconsistent with its designated category („teddy bear‟ for animal 
and „cake on wheels‟ for vehicle). This task showed that participants readily 
associated the novel images with existing categories of real objects, and, more 
importantly, that participants almost always put the objects in the same superordinate 
category within the animal and vehicle domains.  
Pre-test 3: Semantic Properties Questionnaire 
The results from the nearest-neighbour questionnaire reflect the assumptions 
people make when viewing our images for the first time. However, we only asked for 
a nearest neighbour and not how far away the neighbour is. An image may look most 
like a bird without resembling birds very much, if no closer real object comes to 
mind.  
Another problem is that the question only probes the surface properties of each 
novel image. The response “teddy bear” exemplifies the problem. A teddy bear looks 
like a real bear but does not share the properties that make living things distinct from 
artefacts (internal organs, independent movement, etc). To get a better idea of the 
inferences that people naturally developed regarding the objects, we created a set of 
questions tapping semantic knowledge that should generate different answers for 
animals and vehicles. In order to examine the semantic content ascribed to the images 
in the context of a name-learning experiment, these questions were given to 15 
participants after they had completed training and testing for a set of images. These 





Their training sessions were designed to address questions regarding the influence of 
similarity under different learning conditions and are reported elsewhere (Shapiro, 
Lamberts & Olson, 2004). However, results for learning and name verification were 
consistent with those reported below.  
Participants completed the questionnaire immediately after they had 
completed all tests for a set of images. When answering the questions, participants 
were not shown the images again. Instead, they were given the name of each of the 
eight images in random order and asked to answer the following questions: 1. Is it 
living or non-living? 2. What category does it best fit in? 3. What is its normal 
environment? 4. What parts does it use to move? 5. What does it use to get its energy? 
6. What terrain does it move on? 7. What kind of surface does it have? 8. If you 
opened up the outer surface, what would it have inside? 
Participants were asked to respond with 1-word answers wherever possible 
and were given example answers to help with interpretation of the questions. 
There were six questions that were designed to be appropriate to both animals 
and vehicles, but elicit different responses according to the category into which each 
object was placed (questions 1,2,4,5,7 and 8). Two questions (3 and 6) were fillers 
designed to make participants think about each image individually. The filler 
questions were not analysed because responses do not provide information specific to 
animals or vehicles. 
Two naive participants acted as judges. They were shown the answers to the 
six distinguishing questions and were asked to judge whether each response indicated 
that the participant was considering an image of an animal, vehicle, either or neither. 
The judges rated all responses for one question before proceeding to the next 





any one image could not be combined to build up a picture of that image. The judges 
had not seen any of the images so the only information they had was the participants‟ 
responses. 
Pre-test 3 Results 
Responses were appropriate to animals and vehicles and consistent across 
participants. For example, responses for VD4, to question 8 were: engine (x11), 
people, lots of seats, a place for people to sit and drive it (all x1). Responses for AD3, 
to question 5 were: food (x13), plants (x1). However, one participant systematically 
responded to the similar vehicles as if they were animals. We have separated her data 
from the following analyses because it was a systematic misclassification. Although 
this one participant was anomalous, we acknowledge that there may be a slight 
ambiguity in the classification of the similar vehicles. 
We present data from 14 participants. Scores for each category 
(animal/vehicle) are out of 224 (14 participants x 2 judges x 8 images). The results are 
shown in Table 2. Responses falling in the intended category are in bold. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Some participants described the surfaces of the fish and reptiles as “smooth.” 
This was coded as a vehicle characteristic but could also be used to describe aquatic 
animals or reptiles. Some participants responded, “wings” when asked what parts 
were used to move for the planes and these were coded as “animal” responses. This 
method of coding the responses is conservative, since the response “wings” is 
obviously not limited to the animal category and had the judges known that the image 
could be an airplane, they may have coded the response, “wings”, as appropriate to 





animal responses and 94 % of vehicle responses falling in the intended category, 
indicating that participants retrieved information appropriate to animals and vehicles.  
Main Experiment 
The pre-tests demonstrated that our images evoked the intended semantic 
properties, that they manipulated similarity independent of category, and that 
familiarity was matched across conditions. We trained participants to associate 
nonsense names with these images and then conducted a name verification task. 
Method 
Participants 
15 new participants who had not participated in the pre-tests undertook the 
main experiment. All were undergraduate or postgraduate students from the 
University of Birmingham, aged between 18 and 32. Psychology undergraduates 
received course credits and other students received cash payments. 
Training 
Participants completed the experiment in two sessions. In each session, they 
learned either four similar animals and four dissimilar vehicles or four dissimilar 
animals and four similar vehicles. In the training session, an image was randomly 
selected and presented with a choice of eight possible names, arranged in random 
order beneath the image. The participant selected the appropriate name using the 
mouse. If the answer was incorrect, the correct name was displayed. All eight images 
continued to be displayed until participants responded with 100% accuracy to the 
entire set of eight images, eight times in a row. 
The names were all pronounceable English letter sequences, matched for 
consonant-vowel structure and N-count (N-count is the number of real words that can 





corpus, Baayen, Piepenbrock & van Rijn, 1993). One group of names was assigned to 
each condition, counterbalanced across participants. The names are presented in 
Appendix B. The number of correct and incorrect responses participants gave for each 
image was recorded during training. If specialised subsystems enable the identities of 
animals to be acquired more rapidly we would expect animal objects to be learned 
more quickly than vehicles. 
Name verification 
Name verification was used to measure speed and accuracy of identification. 
Name-verification is often used as a test of object recognition because response 
latencies can be measured much more precisely than in a naming task using a voice 
key (e.g. Lawson and Jolicoeur, 1998). A name verification task also allows the 
response deadline to be manipulated (as in Brockdorff & Lamberts, 2000 and 
Lamberts, 1995). After training, participants were given a name verification task 
under time pressure. A name was presented for 800ms followed by an image, 
presented either for 600ms (long deadline) or 400ms (short deadline). Participants had 
to decide as quickly as possible whether or not the name for the image was correct. 
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) suggest that specialised subsystems evolved for 
processing living things because recognizing and responding quickly to animals has 
survival and reproductive value. Even if the effects of a specialised subsystem are not 
apparent normally, they could emerge when the time allowed for a decision is limited. 
For each session, the participant completed training and then the long deadline task 
followed by the short deadline task. The order was consistent across participants to 
ensure that worse performance in the short deadline task was due to the greater 
difficulty of the task rather than practice effects. Each task was preceded by a practice 





disappeared, using a button box to indicate whether the name preceding the image 
was correct or incorrect. When the response was too slow, a buzzer sounded and the 
message “Too slow- Try to respond before the beep”, appeared. No feedback was 
given in the test phase of the experiment. There were 56 trials that tested every 
possible incorrect combination of an image and a name (non-matching trials) and 56 
trials of correct combinations (matching trials). RTs and errors were recorded. One 
week after their initial training and name-verification session, participants returned to 
complete the experiment with the remaining eight images. 
Results 
Training 
A specialised subsystem could either allow greater efficiency in the 
acquisition of new representations, or allow faster processing of existing information. 
The training data was analysed to see if category differences were evident during the 
learning process. The percentage of correct responses made to each image before 
criterion was reached was subjected to a repeated-measures analysis. There was a 
significant main effect of similarity, F1(1,14) = 40.02, MSE = 47.02, p < 0.001, 
F2(1,12) = 44.06, MSE = 20.14, p < 0.001, but no effect of category, F1(1,14) = 2.86, 
MSE = 55.49, F2 (1,12) = 1.08, MSE = 20.14. There was no interaction between 
category and similarity, F1 (1,14) = 0.14, MSE = 50.75, F2 (1,12) = 0.16, MSE = 
20.14. As shown in Table 3, participants performed more accurately for dissimilar 
items than similar items but performance was equivalent for animals and vehicles. 
(Table 3 about here) 
Name verification 
Matching and non-matching trials were analysed separately. Non-matching 





dissimilar vehicles), since only these give unambiguous information about the effects 
of category and similarity. All incorrect and missed responses were removed before 
analysing the data. Extreme RTs, defined as more than 3 times the interquartile range 
from the upper or lower quartiles, were excluded from each participant‟s data.  
Matching Trials 
The response deadline had the intended effect. There was a significant main 
effect of deadline in both RT and accuracy. RT: F1(1,14) = 182.05, MSE = 870.48, p 
< 0.001, F2(1,12) = 433.75, MSE = 94.75, p < 0.001, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 14.40, 
MSE = 6.02, p < 0.002, F2(1,12) = 14.21, MSE = 22.88, p < 0.003. Figures 2 and 3 
show that RTs were faster for the short deadline test, but accuracy was poorer.  
Manipulating similarity and category produced a strong effect of similarity, 
but not category. There was a significant main effect of similarity in both RT and 
accuracy, RT: F1(1,14) = 49.05, MSE = 355.26, p < 0.001, F2(1,12) = 12.14, MSE = 
326.99, p < 0.01, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 4.96, MSE = 13.61, p < 0.04, F2(1,12) = 5.68, 
MSE = 44.54, p < 0.04. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, performance was faster and 
more accurate for the dissimilar conditions. There was also a significant interaction 
between similarity and deadline on RT by participants, F1(1,14) = 5.99, MSE = 
242.18, p < 0.03. However, this interaction was not significant on RT by image, 
F2(1,12) = 2.65, MSE = 94.75 or on accuracy, F1(1,14) = 0.01, MSE = 3.43, F2(1,12) 
= 0.01, MSE = 22.88. Figure 3 shows that the effect of similarity on RT was larger for 
long deadline trials than short deadline trials. Participants were responding very close 
to the short deadline, bringing all RTs much closer together. RT differences between 






There were no significant main effects of category, RT: F1(1,14) = 3.68, MSE 
= 104.77, F2(1,12) = 0.44, MSE = 326.99, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 4.06, MSE = 7.89, 
F2(1,12) = 2.70, MSE = 44.54. However, the effect of category on accuracy did 
approach significance in the by-participants analysis (p = 0.06). Figure 2 indicates a 
trend towards more accurate responses to animals than vehicles. The accuracy 
advantage for animals was 1.33 at the 600ms deadline and 0.73 at the short deadline. 
The similarity difference was greater: 1.53 at the 600ms deadline and 1.47 at the 
400ms deadline. These data, therefore, provide weak evidence for effects of category, 
and certainly do not provide evidence that category differences emerge as time 
pressure is increased. 
The interaction between category and similarity was non-significant, RT: 
F1(1,14) = 0.03, MSE = 1032.48, F2(1,12) = 0.01, MSE = 326.99, accuracy: F1(1,14) 
= 0.002, MSE = 14.89, F2(1,12) = 0.003, MSE = 44.54. The interaction between 
category and deadline was non-significant, RT: F1(1,14) = 1.41, MSE = 189.32, 
F2(1,12) = 1.21, MSE = 94.75, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 0.41, MSE = 2.70, F2(1,12) = 
0.44, MSE = 22.88. The 3-way interaction was also non-significant, RT: F1(1,14) = 
0.16, MSE = 494.67, F2(1,12) = 0.34, MSE = 94.75, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 0.71, MSE 
= 10.6, F2(1,12) = 1.23, MSE = 22.88. 
(Figures 2 and 3 about here) 
Non-matching Trials 
The effect of the deadline was also evident in non-matching trials. Again, RTs 
were faster, but accuracy was poorer for the short deadline task (Figures 4 and 5), RT: 
F1(1,14) = 118.39, MSE = 2208.37, p < 0.001, F2(1,12) = 292.20, MSE = 240.93, p < 
0.001, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 125.72, MSE = 1.32, p < 0.001, F2(1,12) = 82.72, MSE = 





Non-matching trials also showed a strong effect of similarity, but no effect of 
category. All main effects of similarity were significant, RT: F1(1,14) = 25.44, MSE 
= 432.64, p < 0.001, F2(1,12) = 33.54, MSE = 113.65, p < 0.001, accuracy: F1(1,14) 
= 23.68, MSE = 5.33, p < 0.001, F2(1,12) = 13.67, MSE = 34.59, p < 0.003. 
Performance was faster and more accurate for dissimilar images. There was a 
significant interaction between deadline and similarity on RT, F1(1,14) = 13.73, MSE 
= 450.77, p < 0.002, F2(1,12) = 9.76, MSE = 240.93, p < 0.01, but not on accuracy, 
F1(1,14) = 0.52, MSE = 3.63, F2(1,12) = 0.94, MSE = 7.51. As before, RT 
differences between conditions were reduced for the short deadline but accuracy 
differences remained (Figures 4 and 5). 
No effects of category were significant, RT: F1(1,14) = 0.05, MSE = 746.67, 
F2(1,12) = 0.36, MSE = 113.65, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 0.51, MSE = 1.97, F2(1,12) = 
0.11, MSE = 34.59. The trend towards an advantage for living things that was 
observed for matching trials was not present in the non-matching data. There was no 
significant interaction between category and deadline, RT: F1(1,14) = 0.02, MSE = 
738.21, F2(1,12) = 0.03, MSE = 240.93, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 0.14, MSE = 1.46, 
F2(1,12) = 0.10, MSE = 7.51.  
The interaction between category and similarity approached significance in 
RT for non-matching trials by image, F2(1,12) = 4.49, MSE = 113.65 (p = 0.06). This 
interaction was non-significant in all other analyses, RT: F1(1,14) = 2.11, MSE = 
1833.93, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 0.11, MSE = 3.69, F2(1,12) = 0.04, MSE = 34.59. As 
shown in Figures 4 and 5, the disadvantage for the similar images was greater for the 
animals than vehicles. As we discussed in the Introduction, real living things have 
been shown to be more similar to one another than non-living things. If a specialised 





greater sensitivity in distinguishing between highly similar items. However, this effect 
goes in the opposite direction. 
There was no 3 way interaction, RT: F1(1,14) = 0.07, MSE = 1956.01, 
F2(1,12) = 0.03, MSE = 240.93, accuracy: F1(1,14) = 0.02, MSE = 3.86, F2(1,12) = 
0.04, MSE = 7.51. 
(Figures 4 and 5 about here) 
Visual Complexity 
The results from Pre-test 1 indicated that visual complexity was not matched 
across conditions. Vehicles were rated as less complex than animals. If vehicles were 
processed more efficiently because they were less complex, but animals were 
processed more efficiently because they engaged a specialised system, visual 
complexity could be masking an advantage for animals that would otherwise be 
apparent. In order to assess the influence of visual complexity on our results, an 
ANCOVA (analysis of co-variance) was conducted on the data by image. Category 
and similarity were between-item factors, deadline was a within-item factor and visual 
complexity (using ratings from Pre-test 1) was a covariate. The pattern of results 
obtained from the ANCOVA was the same as reported above. No main effects or 
interactions involving category were pushed closer to significance. In fact, the 
interaction between category and similarity on RT for non-matching trials by image 
was non-significant, F2(1,12) = 2.20, MSE = 123.32. The status of all other effects 
was the same. 
Discussion 
If category specific subsystems exist, category effects should be observable in 
normal processing over and above the influence of confounding factors such as 





studies have failed to isolate the relative influences of similarity and semantic 
category on naming performance. We manipulated similarity and category 
independently by using a set of novel animals and vehicles as stimuli. 
Category 
We found little evidence that category was important but strong effects of 
structural similarity. Similarity had a significant effect on learning and on name 
verification, in both RT and accuracy, for matching and non-matching trials. Out of 
all analyses, we only found one set of results where category appeared to have any 
influence. Animals showed a trend toward slightly higher accuracy in matching trials 
with a long deadline. 
As expected, the short deadline decreased RTs and increased error rates. 
Putting participants under increased pressure, however, did not exaggerate differences 
that were apparent at the longer deadline. In particular, effects of category did not 
emerge when faster processing or a quicker decision was required. 
Our learning and name verification paradigms obviously do not exhaustively 
test the advantages that a specialised system might offer. However, we have shown 
that the images were not just treated as visual patterns, and that participants made 
inferences that clearly indicated contact with semantics appropriate to their intended 
categories. In addition, the tasks cover a range of processing—including object 
recognition, storing new exemplars, associating objects with names, and retrieving 
name and object information from memory—that constitutes a considerable sample of 
what might have been expected to reveal the impact of evolutionarily important 
advantages. Therefore, these results are inconsistent with a specialised semantic 
system than confers an evolutionarily important behavioural advantage to the 





in which specialised subsystems have no functional consequence. However, semantic 
specialisation is defined in functional terms (i.e. the animal/artefact distinction is not 
an anatomical distinction). An account that invokes functionally defined differences 
with no functional consequence for normal processing (i.e. brain damage reveals 
organisational structure that must be described functionally, but has no impact on the 
undamaged brain) would create a very general problem for neuropsychological 
reasoning. Although these results are preliminary, in the sense that they set the scene 
for a search for category effects using a range of tasks and stimuli, they are also most 
consistent with a structured unitary semantic system rather than one that makes a 
fundamental distinction between living and non-living categories. 
Similarity 
The idea that similarity exerts a different influence in the category of animals 
and artefacts has taken various forms in the literature (e.g. Sacchett & Humphreys, 
1992; Sartori, Miozzo & Job, 1993; Tyler et. al 2000, Tyler & Moss, 2003), but the 
variations all have an underlying theme. Categories of animals have a basic body plan 
that is essentially the same. Therefore, distinctions among types of animals within 
broad groupings (e.g. mammals, birds) are based on variations in size or surface 
features that are subordinate to the similarity of the overall structural description. 
Furthermore, features that distinguish one animal from its neighbours are often 
uncorrelated with the functional information we have about the animal (e.g. has eyes : 
sees; chicken : lays eggs). Conversely, artefacts do not share a common form, but 
there is a strong connection between structure and function (e.g. the tools screwdriver, 
hammer and saw have different shapes, but there is a connection between their 





Animals may be more difficult for patients to identify because there is 
competition among similar exemplars (Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992). This 
competition may arise either because distinctive information is represented at a level 
lower in the hierarchy used for object representation that is more susceptible to 
damage (Sartori et al., 1993; based on Marr, 1982), or because distinctive features are 
not supported by form/function relationships (Tyler et al., 2000). Nevertheless, all 
accounts agree that information about the basic form of the object is stronger and/or 
better preserved because it is held in common across animals, while identifying 
features are weaker because they are distinctive and/or not supported by links to 
function. Our results make it clear that identification is slower and more difficult for 
items with distinctive features imposed on a common overall structure than items with 
a distinctive overall structure. Crucially, we found that animals and artifacts were 
affected equally by this structural difference. 
Implications for Neuropsychology 
The clear role for similarity in our results from normals has consequences for 
the neuropsychology literature. In fact, there are neuropsychological studies in which 
similarity appears to play a role in category-specific effects (e.g. Arguin, Bub & 
Dudek, 1996; Dixon, Bub & Arguin, 1998; Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati & 
Humphreys, 1997; Humphreys et al., 1998; Moss et al., 1998). However, we do not 
suggest that structural similarity could explain all cases of patients who show 
selective differences between categories. There are cases where similarity does not 
provide an alternative explanation (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Funnell & de 
Mornay-Davies, 1996; Turnbull & Laws, 2000). For example, Caramazza and 
Shelton‟s patient was impaired at recognising animal sounds in addition to pictures, 





that did not tap structural descriptions. Selective deficits for nonliving things (Hillis & 
Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 
1987) are also inconsistent with similarity-based explanations (assuming living things 
are more structurally similar; for an opposing view, see Turnbull & Laws, 2000). 
Nevertheless, our results add to the evidence that structural similarity can 
cause processing differences between animals and man-made objects. Since similarity 
has such a strong effect on normal naming, it will inevitably influence the 
performance of some patients, and must, therefore, be controlled in studies that 
attempt to rule out non-semantic sources of animal/artefact differences. We noted in 
the Introduction that the frequency of neuropsychological cases showing genuine 
selective deficits was one factor that distinguished unitary and subsystem accounts. If 
controlling for similarity reduces the number of selective deficits originating in 
semantics, the weight of evidence supporting a subsystems account will be reduced 
accordingly. 
Ultimately, the problem that the neuropsychological literature presents is not 
only to do with stimulus control or procedure, but a lack of theoretical commitment 
regarding semantics. Without further theorising about how specialised and/or generic 
semantic systems function, and without hypotheses detailing how the principles that 
govern the systems are different, alternative accounts will remain difficult to evaluate, 
and the consequences of adopting a specialised or unitary hypothesis will remain 
obscure. 
However, research in related fields may be useful to neuropsychologists. We 
have borrowed a paradigm from the literature devoted to categorisation and category 





formally specified mathematical models, which might be used to help explore the 
category dimensions that patient errors reveal. 
Likewise, linguists and psycholinguists developing accounts of the 
relationship between semantic and lexical or syntactic knowledge have proposed that 
a relatively small number of distinctions are at the heart of the combinatorial system 
that produces the richness of human conceptual structure. For example, Jackendoff 
(1990) defines a small set of major ontological categories (thing, event, state, action, 
place, path, property and amount). Pustejovsky (1991) defines a small number of 
event types (initial, internal, final) and rules of event composition that underlie word 
structure. Miller and Fellbaum (1991) specify a limited number of categories (26) that 
are the basis for the hierarchy of noun concepts. These kinds of distinctions should 
influence semantic processing and the distribution of errors that arise after brain 
damage, and they give an independently motivated starting point for exploring 
patterns of deficits. 
We have reported that learning and name verification with novel objects failed 
to provide clear support for category-specific semantic organisation, but revealed a 
strong influence of structural similarity. We have noted that neuropsychological 
dissociations are not proof of semantic specialisation. Although it is a plausible 
hypothesis, the evidence for specialised semantic subsystems limited to the domains 
animal, plant and other remains weak. Our results demonstrate that structural 
similarity is an important factor in the processes involved in object learning, 
recognition and naming, and must be controlled in patient studies. We remain 
optimistic about the contribution of neuropsychology to the understanding of semantic 





examines the patterns of neuropsychological deficits more fully, in the context of 
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Pre-test 2. Frequencies of Nearest Neighbour Responses 
AD1: Fly (4), Ant (3), Bee (2), Bug (1). 
AD2: Fish (8), Aquatic animal (1), Crab (1). 
AD3:  Bear (8), Dog/cat (1), Teddy bear (1). 
AD4: Dinosaur (4), Dragon (3), Flying mammal (1), Loch-ness monster (1), 
Bird (1). 
AS1-4: Lizard (5), Worm (2), Centipede (1), Snake (1). 
VD1: Tractor (5), Lorry (1), Bulldozer (1), Truck (1), Building-work-vehicle 
(1), Farm-machine (1). 
VD2: Boat (8), Land boat (2). 
VD3: Tank (5), Car (3), Pod (1), Cake-on-wheels (1). 
VD4: Train (5), Rocket (2), Rocket-missile (1), Tanker (1), Tank (1). 







Names for Images 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Bruka Shoni Dronu Flipi 
Zidle Kimba Vulsa  Jutle 
Denil Pukid Fulag Gigip 








Pre-test 1. Mean similarity, familiarity and visual complexity ratings and category 
membership classifications (Standard deviations, S.D.s, in parentheses) 








(% correct)  
Dissimilar 
Animals 
2.07 (.45) 3.05 (.98) 3.17 (.75) 97 
Similar 
Animals 
4.26 (.56) 3.23 (1.27) 3.62 (.68) 98 
Dissimilar 
Vehicles 
1.95 (.66) 3.08 (.81) 3.35 (.99) 98 
Similar 
Vehicles 







Pre-test 3. Judges scoring of responses to novel animals and vehicles.   
Response 
appropriate for: 
Total scores for 
responses to 
Animals (%) 

















   
Table 3 
Mean Accuracy in the Training Session (S.D.s in parentheses) 
Condition Mean % correct 
Dissimilar Animals 87.43 (5.94) 
Similar Animals 75.55 (13.15) 
Dissimilar Vehicles 83.50 (6.91) 







Figure 1. Dissimilar and similar novel animals and vehicles (labelled AD1 to VS4). 
Figure 2. Name-verification accuracy for matching trials (95% confidence intervals as 
described by Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 3. Name verification RT for matching trials (95% confidence intervals as 
described by Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 4. Name verification accuracy for non-matching trials (95% confidence 
intervals as described by Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
Figure 5. Name verification RT for non-matching trials (95% confidence intervals as 
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